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Following the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now 
common in low-income societies. However, these elections are frequently 
flawed. We investigate the Nigerian general election of 2007, which is to date 
the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by violence. We 
designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on randomized 
anti-violence grassroots campaigning. We find direct effects on violence 
outcomes from exploring both subject-surveying and independent data sources. 
Crucially, we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter 
turnout, and that the violence was systematically dissociated from incumbents. 
We suggest that incumbents have a comparative advantage in alternative 
strategies, vote buying and ballot fraud. Voter intimidation may be a strategy of 
the weak analogous to terrorism. 
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“This election is a do-or-die affair.” 





The slow growth of Africa over the period since independence is now understood as being partly 
attributable to poor governance. Until the 1990s the predominant African political system was 
autocracy. As Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) show, while in some contexts autocracy has 
produced good economic performance, in Africa it has consistently been dysfunctional. During 
the 1990s many African autocracies were replaced by democracy, most dramatically in the 
region’s largest society, Nigeria. Given the dismal record of autocracy, there was a reasonable 
expectation that democracy would achieve both accountability and legitimacy, and thereby both 
improve economic performance and reduce proneness to political violence. However, the record 
of elections in Africa and other recent low-income democracies is not encouraging. Kudamatsu 
(2006) measures government performance by infant mortality and shows that, in Africa, elections 
produce no improvement except in the rare instances in which the incumbent is defeated. Collier 
and Rohner (2008) find that, below per capita income of $2,750, democracy significantly 
increases proneness to civil war and various other manifestations of violence, and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2008) find that in resource-rich economies such as Nigeria, electoral competition 
worsens economic performance unless combined with strong checks and balances. 
 
We attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the surprising (non-)results of democracy in 
Africa by focusing on how elections have been conducted. Specifically, politicians may have 
been heavily reliant upon illegitimate strategies for getting elected. Indeed, numerous recent 
African elections aroused widespread international accusations that parties/candidates had 
resorted to miscounting of votes, bribery, and/or intimidation. Although these strategies may be 
inherently associated to the failure of democracy to improve government performance, our 
objective is to go well beyond the anecdotal: the comprehension of their specific causes and 
consequences may open new avenues for development policy intervention. 
 
While we provide evidence on determinants of all three referred strategies, the main contribution 
of this paper is to use a field experiment to study the use of violence to intimidate voters. The 
context for our analysis is the 2007 Nigerian full round of national and state-level elections: this 
proved to be an all-too-suitable context for our purposes, as during the two days of these elections 3 
over 300 people were killed. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper formally 
analyzing electoral violence, and one of the few papers applying experimental methods to the 
study of elections in the developing world (the others being Wantchekon, 2003, and Vicente, 
2007a). We investigate how intimidation changes voter behavior and which candidates are most 
identified with electoral violence. 
 
To be able to unambiguously identify our causal relationships of interest we need exogenous 
variation in violence-related variables. To this purpose we designed and conducted a field 
experiment where a campaign against political violence was randomized across neighborhoods 
and villages of 6 states of Nigeria (representing all main socio-economic regions of the country). 
This campaign was conducted in half of those locations before the 2007 round of elections by a 
major international NGO, ActionAid, specializing on community participatory development. It 
included town meetings, popular theatres and the distribution of campaign material. It was aimed 
at empowering citizens to counteract local violence, and its activities were designed to reduce the 
costs of ‘protest’ and collective action. It also explicitly appealed to ‘voting against violent 
politicians’. 
 
Our measurement was based on a panel of 1149 survey respondents in all treatment and control 
areas of the experiment. These subjects were interviewed both before the anti-violence campaign 
and after the elections, and constituted the primary focus of campaigners. The interviews elicited 
a wide range of measurements of experience with and perceptions of violence (including specific 
incentive-compatible measurements). Subjects were also asked to report their intended and actual 
voting behavior (before and after the elections). Our survey-based violence variables were 
complemented by the compilation of actual violence measures from event-diaries for each 
location, kept by independent local journalists. Since there is a possibility of conformity bias from 
the treatment on subject-perceptions
1, we drew 300 additional respondents at the post-election 
stage, in treated areas only, who were not directly approached by the campaign. We also asked 
about the closest network of each respondent in the full sample. Both additional sets of data allow 
us to run robustness tests on the validity of subject-reports. 
 
The main mechanism of action we propose in this experiment is therefore based on the effect of 
the campaign on grassroots’ views and perceptions about violence (which ultimately caused less 
occurrences of violence at the local level). Crucially, the described primary exogenous effect of 
                                                    
1 See Vicente (2007a) for a quantification of this potential bias. 4 
the campaign enables us to answer our main empirical questions: on the effect of violence on 
voter turnout (by instrumenting violence with the randomized campaign), and on identifying the 
candidates that are most associated to violent behavior. Additionally, the effectiveness of the 
NGO campaign in reducing both the perception and the actual level of violence itself has notable 
policy implications. 
 
Our most important empirical results point to violence as a systematic electoral strategy with 
systematic consequences for votes. Violent intimidation was identified to reduce voter turnout by 
a clear 10% for each 1/6 increase in electoral violence. And it was a strategy predominantly 
linked to non-incumbent groups (sometimes identified as the main political opposition, as is the 
case of AC in presidential elections). These results are based on robust effects of the campaign on 
violence outcomes, both using surveyed-subject reports and journalists’ diaries. We also find that, 
in contrast with electoral violence, vote buying and ballot fraud tend to be associated with the 
incumbent and with more electorally-contested (swing) areas. 
 
We interpret these results in the context of a specific model of electoral competition. There, both 
incumbent and challenger may intimidate voters towards abstention. In addition, only the 
incumbent may bribe voters to vote for him and may use ballot fraud to win the election. The 
incumbent, who always wins the election in equilibrium, only cares about winning; the 
Challenger only cares about his share of the popular vote. Swing voters contrast fear with money 
offered; base voters are assumed to condition their base support to a peaceful campaign by their 
candidate. In the model, intimidation comes from the Challenger when he is least competitive, 
while vote buying and fraud arise when the Challenger is most competitive. 
 
In Section 2 we set out a theoretical framework of illegitimate election strategies. Section 3 
describes the Nigerian context. Section 4 discusses the design of the experiment, a fuller 
description together with displays of campaign materials being given in Appendices 1 and 2. 
Section 5 gives an overview of the results, using descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents our core 
econometric results and offers robustness tests. Section 7 concludes with some implications for 
policy. 
 
2. How to Win an Election: A Model of Electoral Violence, Vote Buying, and Fraud 
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Citizens are generally expected to use their vote or even lobby (Becker, 1983) to further their 
interests. However, there may be imperfections. Besley (2006) reviews the consequences if voters 
have poor information about government performance (analyzed in-depth by Grossman and 
Helpman, 1996, for a prominent example), or if the allegiance of many voters is predetermined by 
loyalties determined by identity. As information deteriorates and allegiance is frozen, a point is 
reached beyond which those potential politicians who are ill-motivated are not disciplined by the 
fear of losing votes and so enter politics. However, in elections analyzed by mainstream political 
economy the strategies open to candidates remain confined to those prevailing in the mature, 
high-income democracies: only strategies oriented to please regular citizens are considered. In 
many of the newly democratic low-income countries the only aspect of democracy that has been 
introduced is elections. There are neither ‘checks-and-balances’ upon the use of power, nor 
effective regulations for the conduct of the election. Indeed, in Nigeria, the introduction of 
elections in 1999 was preceded by 38 years of the postcolonial era of which 30 were spent under 
military ruling, and so no such regulations were in place. 
 
In this context we propose an original model where electoral violence, vote buying and fraud are 
strategies available to politicians to help earning political power in elections. Note that among 
these strategies vote buying is the only one providing voters with a benefit. Let us describe our 
interpretation of these strategies in more detail. 
 
The use of violence to intimidate voters may have clear advantages. If targeted on discouraging 
known opponents (e.g. as when allegiance is determined by identity) from voting, the pertinent 
voter behavior is highly observable (i.e. the polling station merely needs to be observed). Further, 
it is likely to be widely available to both incumbent and challenger: one hired gang can constitute 
a credible risk of violence to many voters. Vote buying suffers from the obvious limitation that if 
the ballot is secret it is difficult for the politician to enforce the bargain. It may nevertheless 
become effective either if the secrecy of the election is doubted, or if the voter attaches moral 
value to keeping her word. If we take vote buying as encompassing clientelism the enforcement 
problem is solved since ‘payments’ (e.g. public-sector jobs) will be conditional on being elected. 
These strategies are likely to advantage the incumbent, who is expected to have more money, 
may be suspected of being in a position to subvert the secrecy of the ballot, and is likely to be 
more convincing in proposing to ‘clients’ (sometimes by using resources from office holding). 
Finally, vote miscounting is expected to advantage the incumbent since the incumbent is more 6 
likely to control the vote-counting process (e.g. the electoral commission). These are assumptions 
we take to our model. 
 
We now present a formal electoral game where an incumbent I, a challenger C, and a continuum 
of voters of mass 1 interact to allocate political power. The timeline of the sequential complete 
information game is illustrated in Figure 1. It is related to Groseclose and Snyder (1996) who 
explain vote-buying behavior in the context of a sequential game. The Incumbent moves first by 
setting vote buying (or clientelism). Then, closer to the election, Incumbent and Challenger 
choose their levels of intimidation. Subsequently, voters decide whether to vote and for whom. 
Finally, the Incumbent may decide to use fraud to win elections (overriding the popular vote). 
Note that the asymmetry between Incumbent and Challenger on the range of strategies available 
(namely on vote buying and ballot fraud) is an assumption of the model, made for simplicity, that 










Voters are defined on a continuum, with voter  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i . For simplicity we assume that each 
candidate has a base vote of share  j b  ( C I j , = ), with  1 0 ≤ ≤ < j b λ  (λ  is the minimum base 
size, close to 0). We postulate that neither vote buying nor intimidation can affect base voters’ 
decisions on whether and for whom to vote. The remaining voters are ‘swing’ and drawn to the 
polls for private benefits or losses that are enforceable, as described next. 
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which also constitutes our initial ‘swing’ status quo, we break the tie by punishing the candidate 
who has minimal base supporters. In other words, if  λ λ > ∧ = I C b b , then indifference is 
broken in favor of the Incumbent; conversely, if  λ λ > ∧ = C I b b , indifferent swing voters side 
with the Challenger. This assumption is meant to attribute a cost to extremist, ‘anti-social’ 
candidates, i.e. those holding the smallest base-voter share λ : when one such candidate is 
present, any swing voter at indifference is biased towards supporting the mainstream, alternative 
candidate. For symmetry, abstention is the decision taken by swing voters at indifference in case 
both candidates either have higher than minimal or minimal base supporters. 
 
We need to make a further hypothesis regarding intimidation. Although intimidation may help the 
candidates by reducing the turnout of supporters of their respective contenders, we assume that it 
comes at a cost. As the intimidating candidate becomes identified with violence his committed, 
above-minimal base supporters are lost to the ‘swing’ mass, i.e. his support base is reduced, if 
larger, to λ  which may be thought of as extremist support. Regarding base voters, we therefore 
assume an endemic distaste for violence. 
 
We now turn to the payoffs of the candidates. We postulate there are two prizes to fight for: the 
executive prize, attributed to the candidate who wins the election (fixed), and a second-tier, 
political influence prize, which is allocated to the loser – this is measured by the share of the 
votes of the loser in the election (variable). This is because the loser is able to extract rents 
proportionately to his electoral performance
2. The candidates face the payoff 
 
                                                    
2 This assumption could be interpreted in the context of a three-candidate game, where a third political 
player (a bureaucracy) would be inactive and entitled to obtain the second-tier residual power share, i.e. the 
Incumbent’s share of voting. Still, we would be implicitly assuming the winning candidate does not care 
about second-tier political influence – a simplification in our game. 8 
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for  C I j , = . Political benefits  P  are defined as 
 
j j j bS aW P + ≡ . 
 
There,  1 = j W  in case j is the winner of the election -  0 = j W  otherwise. j may win the election 
either through fraud (but only if j is the Incumbent) or, in its absence, through a majority at the 
ballot, i.e. a share of the votes of  ε + % 50  or higher.  j S  is defined as the actual (ballot) voting 
share of candidate j if j is the loser of the election -  0 = j S  otherwise. We assume that winning 
the election is more attractive than all losing outcomes ( b a > ), and that both winning the 
election and earning votes as the loser confer large benefits relative to costs ( b a,  sufficiently 
high). Costs are defined as 
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where VB is vote buying, I is intimidation, and F is the cost of fraud ( 1 = F  if the Incumbent 
uses fraud or  0 = F  otherwise). We assume that the Incumbent has sufficient resources for ballot 
fraud always to be feasible, i.e.  1 ≤ I C  (where 1 is total resources available to the Incumbent), 
and that the Challenger is constrained by  C C M C ≤  (where  0 > C M  stands for total resources 




We now solve the game for the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, by analyzing the different 
parameter sets (i.e. values of  C C I M b b , , ). 
 
First, given the assumptions on the size of the budget of the Incumbent vs. the cost of ballot 
fraud, we know the Incumbent will, if necessary, always resort to fraud to win the election. 9 
Hence, in equilibrium, given the assumptions on a and b  the Incumbent always wins the 
election and the Challenger always maximizes his share of votes as the loser. 
 
We begin by considering the case where  C I b b >  and  λ = C b , i.e. where the Challenger is an 
extremist and the Incumbent has larger base support. As a dominant strategy, the Incumbent will 
want to spend nothing on vote buying, intimidation or fraud - he is already guaranteed to win the 
election ( C I b b > ). Given this behavior, the Challenger will want swing voters to abstain rather 
than side with the Incumbent which they are inclined to do due to the Challenger’s extremist 
position. By threatening intimidation the Challenger can achieve a discrete jump in his share of 
vote at negligible cost. We therefore observe intimidation from the Challenger (only) but neither 














Now consider the situation in which  C I b b >  and  λ > C b . In this parameter set it is still a 
dominant strategy for the Incumbent to be passive. Now however, were the Challenger to resort 
to intimidation, he would lose his base and so necessarily see his vote share decreased. This is the 
case of conventional politics: none of the illegitimate strategies - intimidation, vote buying and 
fraud – is used. 
 
We now turn to cases where the Challenger’s base is sufficiently large to pose a threat to the 




bI  bC= 
abstention  C I b b >
λ = C b
I 
Figure 2: Pure Intimidation 10 
We begin by considering  λ > I b  and  5 . 0 < C b . Since  λ > I b , swing voters abstain and there is 
no point in the Incumbent using intimidation (a strictly dominated strategy). Since a Challenger 
who resorted to intimidation would lose his above-minimal base and thereby receive a smaller 
share of votes, he fights a clean campaign. However, were the Incumbent to fight a clean 
campaign he would lose the election and so he has to choose among the remaining illegitimate 
strategies. We find the Incumbent resorts to vote-buying, purchasing just enough votes to take a 
majority ( ε + C b ) – that will be cost-effective (relative to fraud) given negligible vote-buying 
spending. In this setting, we therefore see vote buying but neither intimidation nor fraud (see 














If  λ = I b , the Incumbent is still obliged to choose at least one of the illegitimate strategies to win 
the election. We may have two outcomes depending upon the size of the Challenger’s base 
(relative to majority) and the size of the Challenger’s budget (relative to the Incumbent’s), with 
the latter determining the relative attractiveness of vote buying and fraud for the Incumbent. 
 
First suppose that  5 . 0 < C b  and  1 < C M . As before,  5 . 0 < C b  opens the possibility that the 
Incumbent buys a majority in equilibrium. Moreover, we know that for the Incumbent to win the 
election through the popular vote, he will have to induce some additional voters to vote for him: 
he cannot just rely upon intimidation. Suppose the Incumbent buys  ε + C b  voters, paying just 
enough to get them to vote, with the remaining swing voters intimidated towards abstention or 
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Figure 3: Pure Vote-Buying I 11 
(indifferently for the Incumbent) bought. Then the best response by the Challenger would be to 
intimidate all non-base voters on the Incumbent’s side towards abstention, yielding an electoral 
victory for the Challenger at negligible cost. The Incumbent must therefore lead the Challenger to 
consider spending his entire budget on intimidation – i.e. a race to the bottom. Since the 
Incumbent wants to win the election, he will buy the share of voters  ε + − I b 5 . 0  (ε  in case 
λ = = C I b b ) – otherwise the Challenger would remain passive (non-violent) and win the 
election. The Incumbent will race to the bottom by spending  ε + C M  with the referred voters (in 
any way - see Figure 4, 
* VB , for an example), so that the Challenger will not be able to bring 
back all of them towards abstention. Crucially this amount is feasible under the condition 
1 < C M , and in fact makes vote buying preferable to fraud (cost-minimizing). Note that, for the 
Incumbent, spending resources with intimidation (on any voter) is useless, as it does not oblige 
the Challenger to match these expenses when he responds. The Challenger will therefore be 
indifferent in terms of electoral results between intimidating and not intimidating. Hence, he will 
opt for the cheapest: clean campaigning. In this parameter set we therefore see only vote buying 














Now suppose instead that either  5 . 0 ≥ C b  or both  5 . 0 < C b  and the maximum vote buying that 
the Incumbent can afford is weakly lower than what the Challenger can intimidate back (i.e. 
1 ≥ C M ). If  5 . 0 ≥ C b , clean campaigning is a dominant strategy for the Challenger. For 
5 . 0 < C b  and  1 ≥ C M , the Incumbent has insufficient resources to win a potential race to the 
0.5-bI+ 
(area)    VB* 





abstention  5 . 0 < ≤ C I b b
λ = I b
I 
Figure 4: Pure Vote-Buying II 12 
bottom. Both possibilities mean the Incumbent cannot use vote buying to win the election, and so 
must resort to fraud. In this parameter set we therefore see only ballot fraud arising in 
equilibrium. 
 
The model thus predicts that in situations where the Challenger is strong no violence will arise. In 
these cases the Incumbent will win the election by resorting to either vote buying or fraud. In 
contrast, when the Incumbent has sufficient support to win through an honest campaign, the 
Challenger may resort to violent intimidation, but he will do so only if he runs on marginal 
electoral support. In this model, the Incumbent never uses intimidation in equilibrium. 
 
3. Background: The 2007 Nigerian Election 
 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with estimated 135 million inhabitants in 2007
3. 
Despite being a major oil producer, with the 10
th largest oil proved reserves in the world (35b 
barrels)
4, it ranks 201 in 233 countries in terms of GDP per capita (1400 USD PPP in 2005
5). As 
implied by this failure to harness oil revenues for growth
6, the quality of governance has been 
low: in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index it ranks 147 in 179 countries 
(2007)
7. In Chinua Achebe’s (1983) words, ‘the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a 
failure of leadership’. 
 
From 1999, with the passing of a new federal constitution, Nigeria moved to civilian rule
8, under 
democratic elections: these happened in 1999, 2003, and 2007. However, all of these elections 
were damaged by widespread electoral malfeasance. By many accounts these elections were far 
from being ‘free and fair’. 
 
The election of 2007, which is the focus of our study, covered four distinct contests: presidential; 
federal house of representatives and senate; gubernatorial; and state assembly. Under Nigeria’s 
federal constitution power is particularly concentrated in the president and the state governors. 
                                                    
3 CIA World Factbook. 
4 Oil & Gas Journal, 103(47), December 19
th, 2005. 
5 World Development Indicators. 
6 In this view, we believe the analysis of the Nigerian case also contributes to a better understanding of 
political incentives in resource-rich countries – and therefore of the ‘natural resource curse’ (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995; Mehlum et al , 2006; Robinson et al, 2006; Vicente, 2006, 2007b; Collier and Goderis, 
2007). 
7 See Smith (2007), for a thorough account of the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria. 
8 See Maier (2000) for a description of this transfer of power and recent political history of Nigeria. 13 
The 2007 election was not contested by the incumbent president, Obasanjo, due to his term limit. 
The key contestants were Umaru Yar’Adua, Muhammadu Buhari, and Atiku Abubakar. 
Yar’Adua was Obasanjo’s chosen successor in the ruling PDP (People’s Democracy Party). 
However, he was little known since until June 2006 Obasanjo had been hoping to change the 
constitution to permit a third term. Buhari had already been the main challenger in the 2003 
election, and was standing for the ANPP (All Nigeria Peoples Party). A previous military ruler, 
his regime had been noted for a public campaign against corruption. Abubakar, although the 
incumbent Vice-President, was in serious conflict with President Obasanjo, and had been forced 
to switch party to the AC (Action Congress). Previously a customs officer with controversial 
sources of wealth, he had been indicted by the federal anti-corruption commission EFCC on 
multiple charges related with campaign fund embezzlement and bribery. At the core of the 
election campaign was the manifest determination of President Obasanjo to prevent Vice-
President Abubakar from becoming the next president. In a phrase that became famous, Obasanjo 
described the election as a ‘do-or-die affair’. 
 
The ruling PDP duly won the election with 70% of votes, as did 28 of its candidates in the 36 
gubernatorial elections. However, the election was deeply flawed through violence, bribery and 
vote miscounting. As illustration we present the assessments of three well-informed independent 
organizations: 
 
‘Rigging, violence and intimidation were so pervasive and on such naked display 
that they made a mockery of the electoral process. […] Where voting did take place, 
many voters stayed away from the polls. […] By the time voting ended, the body 
count had surpassed 300.’ – Human Rights Watch.  
 
‘The irregularities were so numerous and so far-reaching that the election was a 
charade and did not meet the standards required for democratic elections.’ 
Transition Monitoring Group (an NGO with 50,000 Nigerian observers). 
 
‘Nigeria's elections were not credible and fell far short of basic international 
standards. […] Elections for president, state governors and legislators were marred 
by violence, poor organisation, lack of transparency, significant evidence of fraud, 
voter disenfranchisement and bias.’ European Union Electoral Observation Mission. 
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These unfortunate features make the election well-suited for a study of electoral violence. In 
particular, violence may not have been simply a random spill-over from heightened antagonisms: 
it might have been used systematically as an electoral strategy. 
 
4. The Design of the Experiment 
 
To identify effects of violence on voting we need exogenous variation. Since the distribution of 
violence cannot be assumed to be random, our research design was centered around introducing a 
randomly distributed reduction in the perceived threat of violence and measure the consequences 
of this reduction. While to our knowledge this is the first application of experimental methods to 
the study of electoral violence, the method has already been demonstrated to be effective in other 
electoral contexts. Wantchekon (2003) pioneered the application to African elections, evaluating 
randomized political campaigns in Benin. He showed that for the incumbent a message of 
patronage to favored groups was more effective than one of national public goods. Vicente 
(2007a) comes closest to the current paper, analyzing an information campaign against vote 
buying practices
9. Experimental methods have also been applied to more conventional election 
techniques (in American elections) such as canvassing, phone calls, and direct mail (Gerber and 
Green, 2000; Gerber, 2004). 
 
Evidently, the most difficult part of our research design was to achieve a significant reduction in 
the perceived threat of violence in selected locations. As we will show, our intervention to reduce 
the perceived threat of violence was successful. However, necessarily our intervention could not 
eliminate the perceived threat: hence, our results provide merely a lower bound estimate of the 
full effects of voter intimidation on voter behavior. 
 
We allied with the Nigerian chapter of a large and effective NGO, ActionAid, which regarded the 
prospect of political violence as a grave challenge to democracy and wished to counter it. 
ActionAid’s input on designing a powerful campaign against political violence draw on its 
specialist expertise in community participatory development and its experienced field 
infrastructure. Its campaign included town meetings, street theatre, and the distribution of 
campaign materials all highly concentrated in particular locations. We provide details of the 
campaign in Appendix 1. 
                                                    
9 In related empirical work, though non-experimental, Brusco et al (2004) use survey methods to analyze 
vote buying in Argentina. 15 
 
The campaign was designed to oppose voter intimidation through two distinct routes. The first 
was to neutralize intimidation by lowering the perceived threat to individual voters. The analytic 
foundation for this aspect of the campaign is the model of political protest of Kuran (1989, 1991). 
As exemplified by McMillan and Zoido (2004), a public call to a common protest action lowers 
its costs and so makes it easier to resist intimidation
10. More specifically, if politician A threatens 
the known supporters of B, then the more B supporters who turn up to vote the lower the risk to 
each of them. At a minimum A’s capacity for violence is spread over a larger group of potential 
victims, and quite possibly beyond some point the perpetrators of violence are themselves 
intimidated into inaction. The turnout of support for B will thus depend upon the expectation of 
each B supporter as to whether other supporters will ignore the threat. The opposition to 
intimidation consequently embeds a classic collective action problem. The key test of whether 
this first route was effective is thus whether it neutralized the turnout-reducing effect of 
intimidation among supporters of non-violent candidates. The second route by which the 
campaign aimed to oppose intimidation was to emphasize its lack of legitimacy. This was 
designed to make people who had intended to vote for those politicians who resorted to violence 
question whether their support was appropriate. In fact a key component of the slogan of the 
campaign was ‘Vote against violent politicians’. We shall then see whether the campaign could 
persuade these supporters to switch their vote from violent candidates. 
 
ActionAid agreed to implement the campaign in randomized locations. Given the exogeneity of 
this treatment, our impact measurement depended on two sources of information: first we 
conducted a panel survey of 1149 respondents in 24 enumeration areas, with rounds prior to and 
after the election; second we contracted independent journalists (one per enumeration area) to 
report/describe violent events that affected the neighborhood or village, through consultation of 
local bodies (e.g. town meetings, police) – 131 events were identified for the 24 locations, in the 
period before and after AAIN’s campaign (2
nd semester 2006 to 2 weeks after the last April 
elections). 
 
The baseline survey was conducted just before the campaign. The households in the survey were 
then targeted by the campaign in its wide range of door-to-door activities. The post-intervention 
                                                    
10 This idea also relates with theory of informational cascades by Bikhchandani et al (1992, 1998) and 
Lohmann (1994, 2000), which was proposed to explain the behavior of the masses. 16 
survey was carried out after the elections, when results were known and post-election stability 
was achieved. 
 
The survey was representative at the state level, being conducted in two states from each of the 
three large Nigerian regions (Southwest, Southeast, and North). See Appendix 1 for the details of 
our sampling framework. The campaign against violence was conducted in half of the 
enumeration areas, leaving the others as controls. Respondents were asked about violence, about 
their intended voting behavior, and about their actual voting behavior. Evidently, since our aim 
was to determine whether the reduction in perceived violence affected voter behavior, the design 
of the experiment depended upon two stages: that the campaign would reduce the perceived threat 
of violence, and that this would in turn affect voting. Hence, the surveys were designed to elicit 
evidence on each stage. The questions on violence were asked both prior to the campaign, 
focusing on a reference period (‘the last year’), and after the campaign/elections, focusing on 
what had happened just before and during the elections (i.e. ‘from January’, when the baseline 
survey was in the field). The questions on voting were based on intentions (before) and self-
reported actual decisions (after) regarding all the elections at stake in April 2007. See Appendix 1 
for additional details of survey questionnaire design. In the figure below, we show the sequence 














This design allows the use of a classic difference-in-differences econometric approach. In a first 
stage we investigate the effect of the anti-violence campaign on violence outcomes. In addition to 
Figure 5: The Time Frame of the Experiment 
asking about 
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being of interest in its own right, this is a direct test of the mechanism by which the campaign 
might have changed voter behavior. The effect can be elicited through the specification: 
 
ilt l l l it ilt T ft eT dt cY bX a VC ε + + + + + + = * , (1) 
 
where VC is a violence or crime-related outcome, i, l, t are identifiers for individuals, locations, 
and time (before/after), T is a binary variable with value 1 for treated locations, X is a vector of 
controls (demographic, attitudinal), potentially time-varying, Y is a geographical fixed effect. 
 
We can then run a reduced-form specification, yielding the effect of the treatment on voting 
behavior outcomes: 
 
ilt l l l it ilt T nt mT kt jY hX g V ε + + + + + + = * , (2) 
 
where V denotes a voting behavior measure (intended-before and actual reported-after). 
 
We also display results for the estimation of 
 
il l l i il rVC qY pX o V ε + + + + = Δ , (3) 
 
where violence/crime is instrumented by the treatment variable (provided the identification of 
significant effects of the campaign in diminishing violence, i.e. from specification 1). This is the 
way by which we hope to be able to identify the effect of violence on voter turnout. 
 
We use a rich set of individual control variables, including differences in information about 
candidates before and after the elections, campaign activism, and policy platforms perceived for 
the candidates and supported by respondents. 
 
Finally, although we do not rely exclusively on survey respondents (also factual data from 
independent journalists) in our data design, survey measurement may generally have some 
limitations. In particular, since it is based on subject-reports, there is a possibility of encountering 
‘conformity biases’: subjects may adapt their responses as to ‘conform’ to ‘expected’ effects of 
the treatment. To an extent we are defended from survey conformity biases because the survey 18 
and the campaign were independent from each other, with distinct field teams and branding. 
Nevertheless, we attempt to verify the extent of this problem in three ways. 
 
First we created an incentive-compatible individual measure of empowerment to counteract 
violence: we proposed an observable costly action against violence to all respondents in the 
survey (see the next section for details). Second, we compare panel respondents, all of whom had 
been directly approached by the campaign, with an oversample of 300 respondents in treated 
enumeration areas who were not directly approached by the campaign. We are thus able to 
contrast those respondents who were subject to the full range of interactions with the experiment 
(baseline interview, direct individualized campaign, post-intervention interview) with those who 
only face a post-intervention interview. Crucially, we ask common-knowledge questions, about 
their ‘neighborhood or village’. If conformity bias is serious it should therefore be manifest in a 
difference between the responses of these two groups. Third, we identify the most closely 
connected respondents for each respondent in the panel survey. This information is used to 
correlate voting behavior within networks, and to employ these correlated measures of voting 
behavior instead of individual self-reports. This exercise allows us to control for measurement 
biases in voting behavior
11 that are present across networks. 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
We begin with an overview of how respondents perceived problems with the electoral process in 
each of the six states (Chart 1). We use a standardized subjective rating system, scaled 1-4 with 
higher scores indicating a more severe problem. All three of the illegitimate forms of voter 
influence were of concern to voters. In most states ballot fraud was perceived as the most serious 
problem, with the question being posed as ‘How free and fair are the elections in terms of the 
‘counting of votes?’. Voter intimidation was usually the intermediate problem, the question being 
put forward specifically as a concern about ‘security against violence originated by politicians’. 
Vote buying was rated as the least severe problem, although still prevalent, the question being 
                                                    
11 On electoral behavior, we have to date been unable to gather fully disaggregated official electoral results 
and it seems unlikely that they exist for all locations. Results were announced in terms of the overall totals 
in a process that appears to have by-passed the need to aggregate actual votes. Note nevertheless that 
Vicente (2007a) was able to contrast self reports to disaggregated electoral results in Sao Tome and 
Principe’s 2006 presidential election, without significant differences encountered. Although different, 
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe are neighbouring countries, which gives us some assurance that self 
reports may be an adequate source of voting data in that broader geographical region. 19 
presented in terms of ‘someone from a political party offering something, like food or a gift, in 
return for votes’. 
 
 
Evidently our approach depends upon the effectiveness of the anti-violence campaign. While we 
investigate this more formally in the next section, here we provide an overview. Respondents in 
the panel were asked the same questions twice, once referring to the period prior to the campaign 
and then referring to the period after it. Respondents in both the treatment and control areas might 
change their answers due to experiences during the intervening period, but only in the treated 
areas would respondents have encountered the campaign. We therefore focus on whether the 
change in responses differs as between treatment and control areas. First, consider four measures 
of perceived threats: general violence within the community, gang violence, physical intimidation 
(as a pure crime measure), and violence intensity (classified from journalists diary-descriptions 
into a 1-5 scale). For all four measures the treatment areas have a larger reduction in perceived 
threat than the control areas. Further, the two types of perceived violence most pertinent for voter 
intimidation, gangs and physical intimidation, show large falls in the treatment areas but are 
virtually unchanged in the control areas. Next, consider the obverse of perceived threats: three 
measures of confidence in electoral security. Respondents were asked about security, 
empowerment, and knowledge of how to resist violence. All three measures show larger 
improvements for the treatment areas than the controls, and again the most pertinent measure, 











































Source: Own Data (Surveys -Nigeria 2007). Source: Own Data (Surveys -Nigeria 2007).20 
 
Since talk is cheap, as referred, we supplemented the survey with a direct measure of an 
incentive-compatible action. All respondents were given a postcard which they could choose 
whether to post. On the card there was a message demanding that more attention be paid to 
countering voter intimidation. Since in order to post the card the respondent had to go to a post-
office, this was a costly action. The respondent was more likely to incur this cost the stronger was 
her sense that intimidation should/could be countered – see Appendix 1 for the full description of 
this variable’s design. Thus, differences in the response rate between treated and control areas are 
a useful measure of whether the campaign was effective. As shown in Chart 2, in both areas 
response rates were remarkably high: around a third of respondents returned the card, this being 
consistent with a high degree of concern about the problem. But response rates were even higher 
in treated areas than in their controls. 
 
 
Since there is some basis for regarding the campaign as effective, the consequential question 
arises as to whether the perceived reduction in the threat of violence in the treated areas actually 
changed voting behavior. Again, the two-round structure of the survey is helpful in that it enables 
us to focus directly on the change between stated intentions during the first round and actual 
voting behavior as reported during the second round (see Chart 3). 
 
First, consider voter turnout. Unsurprisingly, in both treated and control areas the election 
campaign succeeded in mobilizing people to vote: many people who in the first round of the 





















































Chart 2: Impact of the Anti-Violence Campaign
Differenced After-Before the Campaign (exc. Postcard)
Treatment
Control
Source: Own Data (Surveys, Journals - Nigeria 2007). % for Postcards refers to % postcards received back in the mail.21 
effect was clearly larger. The difference is consistent with the hypothesis that citizens who had 
been intimidated into deciding not to vote found the ‘courage’ to do so as a result of a perceived 
reduction in threat generated by the campaign. However, we are particularly concerned to see 
whether voter intimidation was used strategically by politicians. Hence, we are interested in the 
effect of the anti-violence campaign on the supporters of each party/candidate individually. There 
is a clear pattern. The incumbent parties, both at the presidential and gubernatorial levels, mainly 
PDP, clearly gained as a result of the campaign. Supporters who had intended not to vote appear 
to have been empowered by the campaign to turn out and vote for incumbents. However, the 
campaign had an objective beyond its core intent to empower people to resist being intimidated 
into not voting. The appeal to ‘vote against violent politicians’ aimed to weaken support for 
candidates who supported violence. Respondents initially intending to vote for a politician 
perceived as violent may have decided either to abstain or even to switch to other candidates. 
Most clearly at the presidential level, AC lost support. This is consistent with instability being a 
strategy of political desperation: Abubakar, the leader of the AC, had neither the advantages of 
the incumbent PDP, nor of the ANPP as the northern established opposition party. 
 
 
Indeed, for both the presidential and gubernatorial elections, we find evidence consistent with 
both objectives of the campaign. PDP supporters were more likely to switch from an intention not 
to vote to actually voting in treatment areas. In contrast, AC supporters who had initially intended 

























Chart 3: Impact of the Campaign on Voting Behavior
Differenced After-Before the Campaign
Treatment
Control
Source: Own Data (Surveys - Nigeria 2007).
Presidential Elections Gubernatorial Elections22 
vote switching: AC supporters were also more likely to switch to the PDP in treatment locations. 
We revisit this decomposition in the next section. 
 
6. Econometric Results 
 
We begin by exploring whether the three illegitimate electoral methods, violence, vote buying, 
and ballot fraud, are allocated systematically. These results do not use the anti-violence 
experimental design; they target location-wide determinants of the perceived importance of these 
methods in the late stages of the 2007 election campaign. The results are presented in Table A1 in 
Appendix 3. We begin with a simple specification in which the explanatory variables are the 
expected tightness of the election, and whether the ruling PDP is incumbent in the state. 
Tightness is proxied by the absolute difference between incumbent and opposition scores at the 
location level in the previous gubernatorial
12 elections in 2003. We also control for whether the 
enumeration area is urban although in the event this is only significant for violent intimidation. 
The OLS results find that the tighter is the election the greater are the perceived problems of vote 
buying and ballot fraud, the two strategies that we have suggested are best-suited to the 
incumbent. In contrast, violence is significantly reduced if the race is competitive. The effects are 
large: treating the four-point scale of responses as linear, in tight races vote buying is perceived as 
being 41% greater
13 and electoral fraud 53% more frequent.
 In contrast, violence is perceived as 
being far less of a problem in tight races, with a reduction of 25%. All these effects are 
statistically significant at the 1% level while clustering standard errors at the enumeration area 
level. This is evidence consistent with the idea that political expenditures on vote buying and 
fraud are used strategically when the election is competitive. In contrast, violence may be an 
instrument used for making a political stand by weaker parties or groups when they do not hold 
significant base support (analogously to terrorism). We continue exploring this hypothesis in the 
remaining of the paper. 
 
Controlling for the tightness of the race, PDP incumbency at the state level increases the 
perceived problem of ballot fraud (by 15%), consistent with the hypothesis that for this strategy a 
combination of national and local incumbency is needed. 
 
                                                    
12 The use of gubernatorial election scores reinforces the local nature of political competition we want to 
capture. 
13 The same result appears in Vicente (2007a), consistently with classical swing voter theory (e.g. Dixit and 
Londregan, 1996), regarding the use of vote buying in Sao Tome and Principe. 23 
We next focus more closely upon the chosen strategies by the PDP. While PDP as the national 
incumbent evidently had the advantage in terms of ballot fraud, for the other two strategies 
respondents were asked which party they regarded as the main perpetrator. To investigate the 
strategic use by the PDP of these other methods we create a variable which measures for each 
method the prominence of the PDP relative to other parties in these reports. We then weight the 
incidence of each method by this ratio. With this new dependent variable we find that in locations 
where the PDP is the incumbent it is less likely to resort to violence but more likely to resort to 
vote buying. All effects are statistically significant at least at the 5% level whether we control 
only for state dummy variables, or include basic infrastructural characteristics of the sites
14 and 
individual demographic and attitudinal controls
15. 
 
We also present a very similar exercise using the nationally-representative, 37-state sample of the 
2007 pre-election Afrobarometer survey. While the main dependent variables are the same, the 
subjacent questions were asked in the pre-election period. We find a very similar pattern, which 
allows us to state that our experimental sites do not differ much in terms of electoral strategies 
from a nationally-representative sample. 
 
The core of our analysis is on the effects of electoral violence on voting and on identifying 
‘violent politicians’, and for these we need to rely upon the anti-violence campaign. This requires 
two preliminary steps: the demonstration that the treatment is indeed randomized, and the 
demonstration that the campaign was effective in changing the perceived threat of political 
violence. 
 
In Appendix, Tables A2, we compare the characteristics of the treated and control groups: their 
demographic profiles, baseline violence outcomes, and baseline self-reported electoral 
preferences. Since these variables are unaffected by the intervention, any differences between 
treatment and control are a product of luck. We generally find no statistically-relevant differences 
(at standard levels) between treatment and control groups. The exception is that the control group 
                                                    
14 These were chosen from a list of variables concerning the enumeration areas: existence of post office, 
school, police station, electricity grid, piped water, sewage system, health clinic, recreational facilities, 
places of worship, town halls or community buildings, market stalls. 
15 Demographic controls are chosen from a wide range of variables: gender, age, household head and size, 
marital status, ethnic group and language, religion (faith, intensity), schooling, job status, occupation, 
property, household expenditure and welfare, health status. Attitudinal controls include: consistency 
measures, interest in public affairs, media exposure, campaign activism, knowledge about candidacies, 
policy (perceptions about candidates, own preferences). 24 
seems to have better knowledge of ways to counteract violence (+9%). This is therefore evidence 
that the randomization was generally effective in gathering comparable groups of locations and 
respondents. 
 
Table A3 in Appendix reports our regressions testing whether the campaign was effective on 
changing violence-related measures. We use a wide range of perception and experience variables 
from our survey measurement. The first set concerns general political freedoms: on ‘thinking’, on 
‘joining a party’, on ‘voting freely’, on ‘being free from insecurity’, and on the perceived fairness 
of elections, in general and as related to violence. We then focus on general perceptions at the 
local level: conflict (‘within the local community’ contrasted to ‘within family’), intimidation 
(‘threatening negative consequences in order to induce voting in a certain way’), and electoral 
violence (‘general violence related to politics’). We distinguish between violence from the top 
and empowerment against/sympathy for violence at the bottom. For the first set of variables, we 
display perceptions concerning ‘influence of political assassinations on instilling a climate of 
fear’ (frequent in the 2006 primaries), politicians ‘openly advocating violence’, ‘violent gangs 
being active’, and ‘security from violence originated by politicians’. For the second set, we 
analyze ‘support for do-or-die affair’, ‘local population’s standing against violence originated by 
politicians’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘knowledge of ways to resist violence’, as well as the postcard 
variable, and sympathy for violence. The final set of survey violence measurements comes from a 
batch of standard questions (both perceptions and experience) on local crime (which could be 
indirectly related to politics – namely through gang activities): ‘thefts in public places’, 
‘purposely-made damages to property (vandalism)’, ‘physical threats/intimidation’, and police-
induced problems. 
 
We use specifications with classical difference-in-differences (regressions on the levels – 
specification 1 above). Where level-measurement is not available, namely for questions asked 
only in the post-election survey, we rely upon time differences (gathered from the post-election 
survey) regressed on treatment. The first specification for each outcome variable is run with state 
dummy variables to control for geographical fixed effects, while the second adds controls for 
individual demographic and attitudinal characteristics. We use OLS regressions for all outcomes
16 
                                                    
16 Although these outcomes are based on subjective scales, provided the way these scales were handled 
during the fieldwork (described in the Appendix 1), we are secure that assuming linear distances between 
the different levels is appropriate. As a robustness test, we did run Ordered Probit regressions - these 
generally showed no relevant difference to OLS estimates. 25 
except for the postcard variable, where we use Probit. We cluster standard errors at the level of 
the enumeration area. 
 
Overall we found clear effects of the campaign in most violence-related measures, the results 
being robust both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance to the inclusion of individual 
controls. The campaign changed responses on political freedoms by 9-12%, and those on free and 
fair elections by 18-21%. In terms of general electoral violence at the local level we found: for 
‘conflict within the local community’ there was a 12% effect; in contrast, there was no significant 
effect on perceived conflict within families, which was, of course, not an objective of the 
campaign; we observe a 5% change in intimidation directly conditional on voting. 
 
On local violence originated at the top, effects ranged from a 6% change in the influence of 
assassinations, an 8% change in politicians advocating violence and in gang activity, to a 10% 
change in security from violence originated by politicians. 
 
On empowerment against/support for violence at the local level, we find very clear effects: 12% 
on support for ‘do-or-die’ at the grassroots, 8% on knowledge of ways to counteract violence. 
Recall that in addition to these perceptions the research design included an incentive-compatible 
action: whether the respondent went to the post office to send an anti-violence postcard. We thus 
also analyze effects of the campaign on the postcard variable, a measure that we interpret as 
empowerment to counteract violence. Treated respondents were found to send the postcard 14% 
more frequently than their control counterparts, with statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
We now turn to our survey measures of crime in the locality. The campaign was designed 
primarily to increase people’s willingness to withstand intimidation, rather than actually to reduce 
related forms of criminality. We generally find no significant effects on experience with crime 
but significant effects on perceptions of crime in its different forms
17. 
 
In Table A4 (Appendix), we show effects of the treatment on intensity of electoral violence, as 
reported by independent local journalists (based on information gathered from direct observation 
                                                    
17 We did however find a clear 5% decrease on perceptions of police-induced problems as a result of the 
campaign, i.e. in the same direction as most other violence outcomes. This finding reassures us that the 
campaign does not seem to have been understood by respondents as biased in favor of the incumbent (who 
controls the police), as one would expect from the independent nature of the campaign sponsor 
(international NGO ActionAid). 26 
and local institutions like police and town meetings). We find a 13% reduction in the intensity of 
electoral violence, significant at the 10% level. Once we add incidence to our main regression, we 
keep the same sign but lose the statistical significance. The clear effect on incidence constitutes 
evidence that there was an effect on perpetration of (actual) violence. Indeed, the induced 
reduction in the effectiveness of intimidation (the direct aim of the campaign) could lead to a 
reduction in the actual level of electoral violence as politicians adjusted their strategies. In the 
event, although we find that the campaign generally did not have significant effects on actual 
(experienced) general crime, we find some evidence that actual electoral violence diminished in 
intensity. This fact helps us to interpret our survey-based results away from pure conformity-like 
effects. 
 
We now turn to the effects of our randomized campaign on the electoral behavior of our panel of 
respondents. Tables A5 in Appendix show the regressions of electoral behavior on the treatment 
(key regressions are difference-in-differences on the levels – specification 2). Since all our 
dependent variables are binary we use Probit estimations. As before, for each outcome variable, 
we begin by showing the simple difference-in-differences regression with geographical fixed 
effects; then we add controls for individual demographic and attitudinal characteristics. All 
regressions allow for correlation of errors at the enumeration area level. We focus on voter 
turnout and voting patterns in the presidential and gubernatorial elections, these being the 
elections where the stakes were highest (where the executive powers are concentrated). As in 
Chart 3 we compare intended behavior with reported actual behavior. 
 
One of our key results concerns the effect of violence on turnout. Recall that we measure the 
change from stated intentions to vote to actual behavior as reported after the election and that 
overall almost a quarter of those who voted had done so despite a prior intention not to vote. The 
main purpose of the campaign was to persuade people who had decided not to vote because of 
intimidation to vote after all. Since we can already reasonably conclude that the campaign 
achieved its intended effect, we can interpret this effect of the campaign on turnout as being 
qualitatively the opposite of the effect of electoral violence itself
18. 
 
                                                    
18 However, the campaign also had a secondary purpose: to turn violence into a vote-loser for those 
politicians who espoused it. While the former effect would raise the turnout of those who had been 
intimidated, the latter effect could reduce the turnout of those who had planned to support candidates who 
espoused violence. Hence, the change in overall turnout is the net result of these two offsetting effects. 27 
We find that the primary purpose of the campaign succeeded: the proportion of people who 
changed their mind and voted was 9% larger in the treated group, an effect that is significant at 
the 10% level. Since the campaign merely reduced rather than eliminated the threat of violence it 
is a lower bound estimate of the effect of violence. Indeed, we can go beyond this lower-bound 
estimate as follows. We proxy violence by our most specific measure, namely ‘security from 
violence originated by politicians at the local level’, defined on a 6-point scale, and estimate its 
effect on voter turnout, instrumenting ‘security’ with the treatment as in specification 3 above. 
With this IV approach we target the effect of violence on turnout, a much larger effect: turnout 
increases by 10% for each unit of security. This suggests that electoral violence was an effective 
strategy in keeping those likely to vote for opponents away from the polls. In turn, this may help 
to account for why it was used by politicians. 
 
We now turn to the effects of the campaign on each party’s score. We find that in the presidential 
election the campaign reduced the vote for the AC by 4%, an effect significant at the 5% level. 
Recall that the AC was the weakest of the three parties (nationally) and its presidential candidate 
was portrayed in the media as espousing instability. The reduced vote for the AC is evidence that 
the secondary objective of the campaign also seems to have worked: people who had initially 
planned to support the AC decided to punish it whether by abstention or switching their vote to 
other parties. The other two main presidential candidates’ scores are not significantly changed by 
the campaign. 
 
At the gubernatorial elections the campaign increased the vote of the PDP by 13%, an effect 
significant at the 5% level. However, we might expect violence in the gubernatorial elections to 
vary state-by-state. Even if violence is a strategy of the weak, not all weak gubernatorial 
candidates might resort to it. We certainly find substantial variation: the overall effects are due to 
only three of the six states. In Rivers the PDP gained as a result of the campaign by a clear 25%, 
significant at 1%. In Oyo and Plateau the PDP gained almost as much, by 21% and 19% 
respectively. In all three states the PDP was the incumbent. We do not find significant effects for 
second and third parties at the state level
19. 
                                                    
19 Indeed, several sources point to the importance of electoral violence by marginal groups without a clear 
affiliation to the main parties. For instance, in Oyo state, Human Rights Watch underlined the role of 
violent groups within PDP, defeated in its primary elections. For further details, see ‘Criminal Politics: 
Violence, ‘Godfathers’, and Corruption in Nigeria’, October 2007. In addition, the International Foundation 
for Electoral Systems (IFES), who implemented nationwide surveys during the 2007 Nigerian elections, 
considers 40% of the electoral violence to be originating outside the main parties, PDP, AC, and ANPP (‘A 
Nigerian Perspective on the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections’, August 2007). 28 
 
In the final part of Table 4, we test the effects of the treatment on the specific patterns of vote 
change for the two parties that seem to be identified above as the ones that concentrated 
experimental action (PDP and AC). Namely, we test whether the treatment led voters to move 
from AC to abstention and to PDP (presidential elections), and to move to PDP from abstention 
and from AC (gubernatorial elections). We find evidence consistent with all these effects, 




We now undertake three sets of robustness tests: the first regards testing for ‘conformity biases’ 
in survey data, both for violence outcomes and for voting behavior measures; the second asks 
whether there is a specific demographic profile that was particularly affected by the campaign 
both in respect of its attitudes towards violence and its voting behavior; the third tests for 
contamination of control areas by the treatment. 
 
On conformity, we may still be concerned that our survey measurement of violence and voting 
behavior outcomes may be affected by a tendency of respondents to adapt to specific survey 
conditions (potentially perceived as) correlated with the treatment. 
 
First we test the robustness of the effects of the treatment on violence outcomes – the direct 
mechanism of our experiment. We compare, within treatment areas (only), panel respondents, 
who faced the whole experimental machinery, namely two rounds of the survey and direct contact 
with campaigners, with the post-election oversample subjects. The subjects of the oversample 
were approached only for the second round of the survey and had no direct contact with 
campaigners, although they may still have seen the street activities and been generally aware 
(through their network) of the campaign. We assume that oversample respondents are less 
constrained to conform than panel subjects. 
 
Table A6 in Appendix 3 reports results of difference-in-differences regressions for the questions 
in Table A3 asked both to the core respondents and to the oversample. For most measures there 
are no statistically significant effects of being approached directly. Of course, even were there to 
be differences these might be due to the effectiveness of direct contact rather than to higher 
conformity by the panel respondents. This is clearly the case for knowledge of ways to counteract 29 
violence (significant at the 10% level). However, since overall the differences are negligible we 
can reasonably reaffirm that conformity biases were not severe. 
 
Second we direct efforts into assessing the solidity of our effects on voting behavior. Here we use 
a thorough module of our survey measurement on social networks. We asked each respondent 
about ‘regularly chatting with’ and about ‘family links to’ each of the other subject households in 
our survey (including the treatment oversample). Moreover, we collected, through detailed 
enumeration area maps, the physical distances between each subject household at each survey 
location. These three measures of connectedness between the elements of our sample are used to 
identify, for each subject, the other n closest subjects. This information is used to correlate the 
voting behavior of the respondents with that of their close networks. Fitted values instead of 
actual responses per subject are used in the dependent variable to assess the robustness of the 
effects of the treatment. This exercise clearly assumes that true voting behavior is correlated 
within a network but that measurement biases are not. If the treatment effects are maintained, 
which we show is the case, we may be more secure in dismissing the possibility of measurement 
biases that are correlated across networks in the original data (which we hope to take out by 
performing this exercise). 
 
We find in Table A7 (Appendix) that indeed all main treatment effects, on increasing voter 
turnout, decreasing AC’s performance in the presidential election, and on benefitting the 
incumbents in the gubernatorial election, are maintained. We focus on ‘chatting’ as our preferred 
measure of connectedness of respondents, but also show results using all three alternative 
variables. The physical distance measure (identifying closest links for almost all respondents) 
allows us to increase the number of observations in the regressions. However it also adds some 
noise (since our geographical measure embeds many ‘close’ relationships that do not mean real 
interaction), which generally translates into larger standard errors in the estimates. 
 
We next check whether there is a particular demographic profile that was particularly affected by 
the campaign: both attitudes and voting behavior changing at the same time (Table A8 in 
Appendix). For this we focus on those dependent variables where we have already found a clear 
effect and introduce demographic variables as interactions with the explanatory variables 
deployed previously. Note that for changes in voting the dependent variable is defined on the 
range 1, 0, or -1, corresponding to a change towards party X, no change, and a change from party 
X, respectively: we therefore use Ordered Probit. We found that the characteristics most 30 
associated with both a change in perceptions of violence and in voting behavior in response to the 
campaign were respondents in smaller households, working outside the home, not owning land, 
and of Yoruba origin. The fact that our results rest upon an identifiable group of people who were 
particularly susceptible to the campaign strengthens confidence in our interpretation of the 
mechanism: a change in attitudes leading to a change in behavior. 
 
Finally we test for contamination of control areas (Table A9 in Appendix) by regressing our main 
outcomes of interest (on violence and on voting behavior) on distance to closest treatment area, 
while using control location observations only. Although for most regressions we do not find 
significant effects, there seems to be some evidence of contamination for intensity of violence 
(journals measurement), empowerment, and knowledge of ways to counteract violence. This 





Since the fall of the Soviet Union there has been a proliferation of elections in societies with 
weak governance. In many of these societies electoral competition has produced serious levels of 
violence. Our study is the first to have investigated the causes and consequences of electoral 
violence using experimental methods. The context for our experiment, the Nigerian presidential 
elections of 2007, was the largest African election to date; it was fought over the highest stakes in 
Africa: political control of Nigerian oil revenues; and it was indeed violent. We have shown that 
this violence systematically reduced voter turnout. More surprisingly, it was systematically 
associated with non-incumbent groups. The two other important illegitimate strategies of gaining 
votes, ballot fraud and vote-buying, were both rife alongside violence, but these were employed 
quite differently. They seem to have been used predominantly by the incumbent party and 
deployed most vigorously where the electoral contest was expected to be particularly tight. This 
pattern is consistent with the incumbent party having an absolute and comparative advantage in 
ballot fraud, due to control of the count, and in vote buying, due to the scope for embezzlement of 
public resources. All three illegitimate methods were used strategically. Ballot fraud and vote 
buying were election-winning strategies whereas political violence appears to have been a 
strategy of desperation by the weak and thus somewhat analogous to terrorism. 
 31 
Finally, the success of the campaign suggests that violence can be countered. This is of direct 
importance: in both the Nigerian and the (also prominent) Kenyan elections of 2007 several 
hundred lives were lost. If violence is used by candidates who cannot win, what is its rationale? 
Our best hypothesis is that it strengthens the candidate’s post-election position. However, 
electoral violence is unlike terrorism in one important respect. With terrorism the violence is the 
signal of power, whereas with electoral violence the election result is the signal: violence is used 
instrumentally to improve the result. Voter intimidation works by lowering the turnout for other 
candidates, thereby increasing the share of the violent candidate. We have demonstrated that the 
primary component of our campaign succeeded in countering the reduction in turnout. It did this 
by emboldening people not to be intimidated by threats. However, a campaign aimed only at 
emboldening people cannot hope to eliminate the power of threats to intimidate. Thus, this 
objective of the campaign can merely make voter intimidation less effective. The induced 
response of those politicians using violence may be to divert effort to other strategies, but it could 
instead be to increase threats so as to counter the reduced efficiency. This is the significance of 
the other component of the campaign: to reduce the vote of violent candidates. This also 
succeeded. Unlike the anti-intimidation message, the message not to vote for violent candidates 
has the potential to make violence counter-productive. We have demonstrated that a dual-purpose 
campaign can successfully deliver both messages. An implication is that political violence can be 
effectively countered by a rather straightforward measure. 32 
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The anti-violence campaign reached 12 enumeration areas (neighborhoods or villages). As 
referred, this was a random choice within the chosen 6 states of Nigeria. The randomization was 
conducted by the authors. It was implemented by ActionAid International Nigeria (AAIN - 
http://www.actionaid-nigeria.org/) during a two-week period, February 13
th to 27
th, 2007, just 
after the baseline survey. 
 
AAIN is Nigeria’s chapter of global ActionAid, headquartered in South Africa, with total budget 
USD 133m in 2005, and specializing on Community Improvement and Capacity Building – it 
was ranked 20th worldwide in terms of ‘performance’ in a recent list compiled by Financial 
Times/Dalberg of global organizations devoted to philanthropy (above Transparency 
International, UNDP, or Amnesty International)
20. 
 
For this campaign, AAIN worked with local state-level partner NGOs, who actually conducted 
the campaign activities in the field. The authors of the paper supervised operations in the field in 
4 out of the 6 states involved in this campaign. Since each state was allocated a different team of 
campaign fieldworkers, campaign activities were fully contemporaneous in all states. 
 
The campaign consisted of a clear message against electoral violence, embedded in the main 
slogan (‘No to political violence! Vote against violent politicians.’). The main guidelines of the 
campaign were discussed with the authors, the central AAIN officers, and the local partnering 
NGO representatives. Actual material and activity design was undertaken with the help of a 
specialized firm in Abuja. 
 
The slogan of the campaign was written in a wide range and large quantity of distributed 
campaign materials: t-shirts (3,000, i.e. 1 for every 2 households in treated locations on average), 
caps (3,000), hijabs for Muslim women (1,000), leaflets (5,000), posters (3,000), and stickers 
(3,000) – images for the leaflets/posters and stickers are displayed in Appendix 2, Figure A1. 
Note that these means of campaigning are the ones primarily chosen by politicians in Nigeria to 
                                                    
20 See the Financial Times, July 5
th, 2007, Report on ‘Corporate Citizenship and Philanthropy’. 35 
licitly spread awareness about their candidacies. The campaign also included road shows. These 
were used to help widening the coverage of the main message and the distribution of materials 
(particularly important in urban locations), and included jingles in Yoruba, Hausa, and Pidgin 
English. 
 
The campaign was however designed to work mainly through the holding of town meetings and 
popular theatres. The town meetings were designed to provide an opportunity for grassroots to 
meet with local representatives for finding ways of counteracting politically-motivated violence – 
theoretically they were built to minimize the collective action problem that is associated to 
finding effective ways of diminishing conflict at the local level. Popular theatres were based on 
the same script for all states (featuring one good and one bad politician, with the bad one 
instilling violent intimidation), and were designed to target youths (usually the ones providing 
labor for violent activities) and other audiences (e.g. women) not as easy to recruit for town 
meetings
21. The campaigners were instructed to primarily target panel respondents (i.e. baseline 
subjects
22), not only in terms of distribution of materials, but also in terms of invitations to 
attending the town meetings and the popular theatres. 
 
The campaign broadly happened in orderly terms, without substantial obstacles, in a timely 
manner. Some examples of the worst problems confronted are given in the following passages of 
state-level reports: 
 
Any campaign in Warri cannot be carried out without police involvement. As such 
the Divisional Police Officer was contacted; five police officers were allotted for the 
campaign at Ogiame Primary School. [...] The campaign went on smoothly. – Delta 
state. 
 
‘The last day of the campaign in Rukpakwolusi witnessed the storming of the 
community by militants of the Niger Delta People Volunteers Force shooting 
sporadically into the air in a convoy of vehicles at the exact location where the 
community had gathered to witness the campaign drama. When the militants 
                                                    
21 A report of the campaign, including systematic photos and films for each state’s campaign activities is 
available from http://www.iig.ox.ac.uk/iig/research/09-political-violence-nigeria/. These include a thorough 
depiction of the all campaign materials and activities. 
22 At least one campaign representative accompanied the survey team during the pre-election survey, 
primarily for site identification, and respondent addresses were shared with the campaigners at that stage. 36 
alighted from their vehicles, some of them recognized the presence of 
Commonwealth of Niger Delta Youths leadership at the venue and actually did not 
harass anybody, but requested that campaign materials should be distributed to 
them. That was complied on the directive of the state project coordinator.’ Rivers 
state. 
 
‘The thug nature of Kasuwan-nama community [part of North Jos treatment 
enumeration area] members disturbed the fluid process the campaign anticipated. 
The most scary part was the sharing of campaign materials which resulted into a 




Our field experiment included 24 locations/enumeration areas. These were chosen within 
Afrobarometer’s (http://www.afrobarometer.org/) representative sample of all 36 states of Nigeria 
that served in their 2007 pre-election survey (contemporaneous to ours). Their sample choice 
used census data (i.e. weighted by the distribution of households) and corresponding enumeration 
areas (all averaging approximately 500 households). It included 301 enumeration areas. 
 
Our sampling has a non-random component as we chose 2 states in each of the three main regions 
of the country (Southwestern, Southeastern, and Northern), by looking at the recent history of 
politically-motivated violence. Namely we used reports by Human Rights Watch
23, ActionAid 
International, and other independent sources. This process led to choosing Lagos and Oyo 
(Southwestern), Delta and Rivers (Southeastern), and Kaduna and Plateau (Northern). This option 
revealed our emphasis on studying violence over studying the ‘country’ (which would be 
achieved under a representative choice of states), while keeping the basic, traditional diversity of 
the country - very much borrowed from the conventional ethnic predominance of Yoruba in the 
southwest, Igbo in the southeast, and Fulani/Hausa in the north. 
 
The remaining stage of the sampling process was purely random. We began by randomly 
choosing 2 ‘treated’ enumeration areas in each of the 6 states from Afrobarometer’s list. Then we 
chose ‘control’ areas by selecting the closest locations from each of the ‘treated’ that were in 
                                                    
23 See for instance Human Rights Watch, ‘Testing Democracy: Political Violence in Nigeria’, April 2003, 
‘Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: the Unacknowledged Violence’, June 2004. 37 
Afrobarometer’s list and that were of the same type in terms of the classification ‘large urban’, 
‘small urban’, and ‘rural’ (stemming from the census). This process led to choosing the areas 
shown in Map A1, Appendix 2. 
 
The data-gathering fieldwork was performed jointly with Afrobarometer and their long-standing 
Nigerian partner Practical Sampling International (PSI) for the baseline survey. At that time, 
households within a census area were chosen randomly using Afrobarometer’s standard 
techniques (e.g. by choosing the n
th house). Then the conditions for sampling within a household 
were: 18 years of age or higher, residence in the corresponding enumeration area. In the baseline 





In the post-election survey, we were on the field through PSI, though not involving 
Afrobarometer’s explicit collaboration. At that time we sought to visit the same respondents that 
were included in the sample for the baseline – we could re-survey 1149 (96%) of those subjects in 
the period May 22
nd to June 5
th, 2007. During the same time frame, we gathered a fresh sample of 
300 respondents in treated enumeration areas (25 per enumeration area), what we will refer to as 
the treatment post-election oversample. The only additional requirement for this group’s sampling 
procedure (apart from the referred standard rules) was that they were ‘not directly approached’ by 
the campaign team. This way we made sure that this group could serve as a control group within 
treatment areas for direct campaigning. 
 





On questionnaire design, while the baseline was jointly designed with Afrobarometer, therefore 
including some modules that are not related with our field experiment (e.g. public opinion 
questions), the post-election instruments (panel and oversample) were fully targeting this 
experiment.
24 This setting implied that in the post-election surveys we could include a larger 
number of questions related to our measurements of interest (e.g. including extended 
demographics). The basic structure of questionnaires was however untouched across different 
                                                    
24 All questionnaires are available upon request to the authors. 38 
instruments, including by order, demographics, the different measures of violence, information 
about elections, and self-reported electoral preferences/behavior. 
 
Note that most prominently on violence, the majority of the questions featured a subjective scale. 
These scales (usually) had an odd number of options, were approached verbally using qualifiers 
(not numbers), and were read in a stepwise manner. For instance, the question ‘How secure 
against violence originated by politicians has been your neighborhood or village?’ embedded 7 
possible answers ranging from ‘Extremely insecure’ to ‘ Extremely secure’, with middle answers 
‘neither insecure nor secure’, and ‘somewhat’, ‘very’ insecure/secure. These options were 
approached first by referring to a 3-point scale: ‘insecure’, ‘neither insecure nor secure’, and 
‘secure’. Then, depending on the answer, the enumerator could deepen one of the sides. This 
careful and balanced way of reading scales gives us some assurance that original question-scales 
were perceived linearly by respondents. 
 
The Postcard Variable 
 
One of the measurements that only took place during the post-election period was the one relating 
to our ‘postcard variable’. During the interview in the post-election surveys (panel and 
oversample), we provided the respondents with a pre-stamped (ready-to-mail) postcard – the 
main side of the postcard is shown in Appendix 2, Figure A2 (it was addressed to PSI in Lagos on 
the other side and did not require the sender to identify him/herself). Enumerators explained to 
respondents that sending the card would contribute to having the sponsors of this project highlight 
the concern for the problem of political violence in the respondent’s state. Each postcard was 
numbered and we could therefore identify the sender. We interpret the sending of this postcard as 
an incentive-compatible measure of empowerment to counteract violence, as it embedded an 
individual cost of taking the postcard to a post office
25. 
                                                    
25 We nevertheless control for obvious determinants of postcard sending like income and distance to post 
office. 39 
Appendix 2: Field Materials and Sample 
 




Figure A2: Postcard 
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Note: Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These results come from OLS regressions.
household size 6.43 6.46 1500
Basic Demographics
female 0.5 0.5 1500
age 32.95 32.69 1497
Ethnicity and Religion
schooling (0-9) 4.31 4.83 1500
single 0.38 0.42 1449
married 0.58 0.55 1449
muslim 0.34 0.25 1499
religious intensity (1-6) 4.76 5.07 1485
christian 0.62 0.74 1499
1500
agriculture 0.16 0.12 1500
job stability (0-3) 1.36 1.41 1500
industry/services: other 0.11 0.15 1500
Occupation
industry/services: trader 0.13 0.14 1500
public official 0.07 0.07 1500
industry/services: artisan 0.11 0.13 1500
housework 0.12 0.09 1500
student 0.22 0.22
fridge 0.29 0.37 1496
cattle 0.33 0.37 1495
house 0.61 0.58 1496
land 0.53 0.56 1494
tv 0.63 0.72 1497
radio 0.89 0.93 1499




land phone 0.1 0.1 1496
hausa 0.16 0.1 1500
yoruba 0.32 0.28 1500
igbo 0.07 0.16 1500
Property and 
Expenditure44 
Table A2 (continued): Differences across Treatment and Control Areas - Panel
































































Note: Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These results come from OLS regressions.
empowerment against violence (1-
7)
4.25 4.81 1116
influence of assassinations (1-7) 3.35 3.05 1125
support for 'do-or-die affair' (1-7) 3.2 3.32 1135
security (1-7) 4.53 4.55 1144
thugs' violent activities       (1-7) 3.03 2.77 1140
politicians advocating violence (1-
7)
2.9 3.29 1128
conflict within community (0-4) 1.18 1.29 1184
conflict within family (0-4) 0.61 0.6 1194
'violence is justified' (1-5) 2.08 2.05 1181
political intimidation (0-3) 0.09 0.1 1089
knowledge of ways to counteract 
violence (1-7)
4.75 4.62 1133
standing against violence  (1-7) 4.85 4.97 1136
vandalism (perception) (1-7) 2.42 2.19 1130
vandalism (experience)     (1-4) 1.09 1.05 1137
thefts public place (perception) (1-
7)
2.88 2.59 1142
thefts public place (experience) (1-
4)
1.17 1.26 1193
turnout 2003 0.7 0.7 1174
free & fair 2003 election  - 
general (1-4)
3.24 3.00 961
free & fair 2003 election - 
violence (1-4)
2.98 2.87 977
problems with police (1-7) 2.76 2.56 1122
physical intimidation (perception) 
(1-7)
2.34 2.3 1145
physical intimidation (experience) 
(1-4)
1.14 1.09 1195
anpp 2003 presidential 0.16 0.08 1149
ac 2003 presidential 0.03 0.05 1149
pdp 2003 presidential 0.45 0.48 1149
Violence
intensity (journals) (1-5) 2.72 2.73 57
Panel Attrition
Electoral Behavior
panel re-surveying 0.97 0.95 1200
anpp 2003 governor 0.13 0.09 1149
ac 2003 governor 0.03 0.03 1149
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A4: Regressions of Violence Outcomes from Journaling (on Treatment)
Intensity & 
Incidence
coef -0.03 0 -0.01 -0.05
std err 0.25 0.17 0.14 0.14
coef -0.16 0.2 0.33 0.2 0.02
std err 0.23 0.3 0.17* 0.2 0.22
coef -0.36 -0.4 -0.51 -0.08
std err 0.37 0.28 0.29* 0.42
coef 2.66 2.69 2.37 2.65 2.84
std err 0.10*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.33*** 0.34***
No No Yes Yes Yes
No No No Yes Yes
74 131 131 131 131
0 0 0.07 0.06 0
Note: Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level.
















Table A5: Regressions of Voting Behavior (Turnout)
ME ME ME
coef 0.44 0.31
std err 0.14*** 0.13**
coef -0.16 -0.21
std err 0.13 0.14
coef 0.11 0.33




std err 0.15** 0.28
Note: Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent Variable ------> Turnout in 2007 Round of Elections
Probit IVProbit
Regional Fixed Effects/Dummies Yes Yes Yes







Number of Observations 2321 1927 977
Demographic/Political Controls No Yes Yes




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































coef -0.48 -0.27 -0.06 -0.32 -0.41
std err 0.16** 0.11** 0.03* 0.14** 0.16**
coef 0 0.14 -0.04 0.24 -0.01
std err 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.11** 0.17
coef -0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.18 -0.02
std err 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.09* 0.11
coef 2.9 2.18 1.06 1.86 3
std err 0.29*** 0.15*** 0.03*** 0.17*** 0.33***
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1727 1697 1727 1729 1704
0.21 0.24 0.01 0.32 0.22
Note: Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent Variable ------>
Crime (Perceptions and Experience)
Number of Observations
Adjusted R-squared (OLS)
Regional Fixed Effects
Main Explanatory 
Variables
time
treat
time*treat
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